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The Resource Curse
The publication of CDPR’s fi rst De-
velopment Digest comes at a critical his-
torical juncture. A severe global fi nancial 
crisis has swept across both developed and 
developing countries and is ushering in a 
sharp global slowdown of growth. Many 
governments in developed countries have 
responded quickly to shore up troubled 
fi nancial institutions, lower policy interest 
rates and provide both increased public 
expenditures and cuts in taxes.
Since many developed countries are 
now slipping into recession, developing 
countries are confronting an inevitable 
slowdown in exports and growth. While 
just a few months ago commodity prices 
were on the rise, now they are in clear 
decline, led by plunging oil prices. There 
is rising alarm about the probable nega-
tive impacts on poorer countries of such 
calamitous trends.
This Development Digest highlights 
the development prospects of a range of 
countries that have enjoyed resource abun-
dance and, until recently, have reaped the 
benefi ts of the boom in exports of primary 
commodities. In development circles, the 
debate on such prospects has focused on 
the likelihood of the so-called ‘Resource 
Curse’—namely, a negative impact on 
long-term growth of excessive reliance on 
exporting an abundance of primary com-
modities. 
Those analysts who have made Resource-
Curse predictions will now, no doubt, 
underline the drop in export prices and the 
consequent decline in revenue and national 
income as confi rmation of their warnings. 
But the ultimate outcomes hinge critically 
on the policy response of each country.
How countries respond in the short term to 
the crisis could be decisive. For example, 
many of the IMF Article IV agreements 
with developing countries still target rising 
infl ation, not slowing growth, as the chief 
danger and advocate strict infl ation target-
ing and fully fl oating exchange rates as the 
appropriate policy responses. Such policy 
regimes are likely now, however, to be 
grievously counter-productive.  
Identifying Viable Policy Options
The overriding concern of the articles in 
this Digest is to help countries identify 
viable policy options that will enable them 
not only to confront a global slowdown 
but also continue to capitalise on their 
resource abundance and chart a viable 
long-term development strategy. 
The Digest’s country case studies include 
Angola and Zambia in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Brazil, Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Venezuela in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Yemen in the Middle East and 
Uzbekistan in Central Asia. Each of these 
countries recently enjoyed the benefi ts of 
an upsurge in revenue from the export of 
primary commodities, such as oil, gold and 
copper. Now they are facing the prospect 
of a slowdown in export demand.
Even when these countries were benefi t-
ing earlier this year from rising global 
commodity prices, many of them still had 
to adjust to the prospect of the eventual 
depletion of the natural resources that 
supported their prosperity. They also had 
to confront the possibility that in the short 
term a large infl ux of export revenues 
could have jeopardized their macroeco-
nomic stability and slowed growth in their 
other vital economic sectors, especially 
manufacturing.
This is why, since the 1980s, a large 
number of researchers have claimed that 
having an abundance of resources can 
often be a curse, rather than a blessing, 
for developing countries. Many different 
explanations have been provided for such 
a ‘Resource Curse’. This Development 
Digest focuses on macroeconomic and 
structural factors and the related debate on 
the economic policies most appropriate to 
counteract any adverse impacts of resource 
abundance and foster long-term sustain-
able growth and development. 
The Dutch Disease
One of the most well-known explana-
tions for a Resource Curse is the so-called 
‘Dutch Disease’ phenomenon. Under 
this scenario, an infl ux of export revenue 
would be expected to appreciate the 
nominal exchange rate and cause higher 
infl ation. These factors could drive up 
the real exchange rate and undercut the 
international competitiveness of the other 
export sectors of the economy.
But a number of contributions to this 
Digest dispute the claim that such 
exchange-rate appreciation is inevitable 
or that, even if it did occur, it could not 
be effectively addressed by coordinated 
macroeconomic policies. For example, the 
Zambia case study argues forcefully that 
the government’s current preference for 
an infl ation-targeting monetary regime—
combined with freely fl oating exchange 
rates—does not allow it to successfully 
manage the real exchange rate. Hence, if 
Dutch Disease symptoms have arisen, they 
have been due primarily to inappropriate 
macroeconomic policies.
The Angola case study also argues against 
exchange-rate fl exibility and endorses 
the government’s management of the real 
exchange rate as its main stabilisation 
tool. Also, the case study of Trinidad and 
Tobago maintains that the recent apprecia-
tion of the country’s exchange rate could 
have been tackled by greater coordination 
of macroeconomic policies, especially 
monetary and fi scal policies.
The case study of resource-rich Brazil 
notes that the country exhibits symp-
toms similar to those of a Dutch Disease 
although these appear to result from mac-
roeconomic policies rather than improved 
terms of trade. The study links the pro-
longed overvaluation of Brazil’s exchange 
rate to the central bank’s high interest rate 
policy and its associated touch stance on 
low infl ation targets. 
Combined with a fl exible exchange-rate 
regime and a liberalised capital account, 
Brazil’s high interest rates have encour-
aged a sizeable infl ow of portfolio invest-
ment that has kept the exchange rate over-
valued. Hence, the study proposes a policy 
response similar to that recommended for 
other countries in this Digest—namely, 
abandon infl ation targeting and manage 
the exchange rate.
In sum, the case studies offer heterodox 
macroeconomic advice on how to deal 
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The case studies offer 
heterodox macroeco-
nomic advice on how 
to deal with a Dutch 
Disease.
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with a Dutch Disease. This is often centred 
on managing the real exchange rate and 
abandoning an infl ation-targeting mon-
etary regime, and complementing such a 
policy stance with more regulation of the 
capital account.
A variation on the ‘Resource Curse’ 
hypothesis is that a successful exporting 
sector—whether based on valuable energy, 
mineral or metal resources—is usually 
an enclave, having few linkages with, or 
weak multiplier impacts on, the rest of the 
domestic economy. 
If the exporting sector is capital-inten-
sive—which characterises many energy 
exporting industries—then it will pro-
vide few jobs directly. And because the 
exporting sector is an enclave, it will also 
stimulate only limited employment in the 
rest of the economy. 
The Lack of Diversifi cation
This hypothesis also often claims that the 
government has few incentives to help 
develop the rest of the economy since its 
revenues from the export of the abundant 
resource are plentiful. The private sector is 
also not motivated to invest in other sec-
tors since the exporting sector provides the 
biggest profi ts. 
If such dynamics persist, then over time 
the economy is likely to become more 
dependent on the export sector rather than 
less. Hence, the economy will become less 
diversifi ed, and even more vulnerable to 
external shocks.
Many of the case studies in this Develop-
ment Digest focus on this problem and 
offer recommendations on how resource-
abundant countries could diversify their 
economies. They place a heavy emphasis 
on using export revenues to fi nance public 
investment and stimulate private invest-
ment. They also recommend the use of 
industrial policies to direct resources to 
economic sectors with the greatest growth 
and employment potential.
The case study of Uzbekistan offers some 
instructive lessons in this regard. The 
country was relatively immune to the 
recent problems of rising food and energy 
prices because beginning early in its tran-
sition, it used import-substitution policies 
to build up its own oil exporting sector and 
eventually became self-suffi cient in wheat 
production. 
So, benefi ting now from rising exports 
of gold, energy and cotton, the country 
has been able to achieve huge current 
account surpluses. The study argues that 
Uzbekistan could now mobilise such 
resources to fi nance investment that could 
help diversify its economy and contribute 
to sustainable economic growth, even in 
the event of a global economic slowdown.
The case study of Yemen shows that its 
development prospects are less promis-
ing than Uzbekistan’s, in part because 
while it has enjoyed an export boom in 
oil, it has neglected to fi nance the devel-
opment of agriculture. Hence, the recent 
increase in its infl ation rate has not been 
due to a Dutch-Disease appreciation of its 
exchange rate but to the rising costs of its 
food imports and persistently low produc-
tivity in its agricultural sector.
The case study of Venezuela is notewor-
thy for underscoring the importance of 
the political economy basis for a positive 
or negative effect of increased resource 
rents—such as from oil—on long-term 
productivity and growth. It argues, for 
instance, that during the periods that 
Venezuela was successful in converting its 
resource abundance into a ‘blessing’ in-
stead of a ‘curse’, its development strategy 
was backed by a consolidated state that 
enjoyed cohesive political support. When 
such political conditions are lacking, states 
are often unable to effectively manage 
resource rents even when they adopt ap-
propriate policies.
Public and Private Investment
Many of the case studies focus on the im-
portance of public and private investment 
as the means to stimulate domestic de-
mand, expand the domestic supply capac-
ity of the economy and direct resources to 
the sectors that have the most potential for 
growth and employment. They endorse a 
central role for public investment because 
they believe that it can help stimulate, i.e., 
‘crowd-in’, private investment. 
However, in some of the case-study 
countries, such as Yemen, it is clear that 
fi nancial liberalisation has weakened 
the domestic banking system so that it is 
unable to mobilise savings and channel 
it effectively to private investment. In 
Uzbekistan, a weak fi nancial system has 
also led to a marked decline in private 
investment. So, in the long term, build-
ing up the capacity of the fi nancial sector 
will be critical for mobilising resources 
for domestically generated growth in such 
countries.
In the medium term, a number of the 
case studies call for employing industrial 
policies to direct resources to strategically 
important economic sectors. This is the 
case, for example, in the studies of Brazil, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Uzbekistan. Key 
sectors could include those producing 
either exports or import substitutes. And 
support could include some time-bound 
protection of domestic markets, subsidised 
credit provided by the fi nancial sector or 
tax incentives provided by government.
Raising Domestic Revenue
One of the usual presumptions about 
resource-abundant countries is that since 
their governments often receive abundant 
revenues from exporting a high-priced 
primary commodity, they have weak in-
centives to raise domestic revenues. 
But revenues from such exports are often 
highly volatile, mainly because of fl uc-
tuating international prices. When prices 
are low, governments are prone to offer 
international investors many attractive tax 
breaks and exemptions in order to induce 
them to help revive the depressed export 
sector. 
When commodity prices soared in recent 
years, some governments were unable to 
reap commensurate revenue because of 
such tax concessions. The article on Chile 
and Zambia, both of which are signifi -
cant exporters of copper, highlights the 
strategic revenue choices that government 
can make. 
Through retaining a signifi cant share of 
public ownership of the copper mines and 
carefully managing the resultant revenue, 
Chile has succeeded in generating ample 
domestic revenue. In contrast, because 
Zambia offered lavish tax exemptions to 
multinational fi rms when it privatised the 
copper mines, it received only modest 
benefi ts from the recent boom in copper 
prices.
From Boom to Bust?
It appears clear now that the recent boom 
in the demand for primary commodities is 
waning. Some of the case-study countries, 
especially those enjoying a large stock 
of foreign-exchange reserves, remain in 
an advantageous position to weather the 
storm in the short term. Over the long 
term, the countries that are able to use 
export revenue from primary commodi-
ties to channel investible resources into 
diversifying their economies will have 
the best chance of achieving a sustainable 
rate of economic growth and employment 
generation.
The likelihood of bleaker prospects for ex-
port revenue in the coming period imparts 
added weight to many of the macroeco-
nomic and structural recommendations in 
this Development Digest. These include 
abandoning unnecessarily restrictive 
monetary policies, instituting measures 
to maximise revenue from exports and 
encouraging, where feasible, continuing 
public and private investment that can stra-
tegically diversify the economic base. 
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    Angola: Transitioning from Oil-Led to 
                Broad-Based Growth
by Ricardo Gottschalk and Pedro M.G. Martins, Institute for Development Studies
Angola has had a remarkable economic 
recovery since the end of the civil war in 
2002. During the period 2003-2007, its 
annual GDP growth was over 15 per cent. 
Infl ation declined from nearly 100 per 
cent to less than 13 per cent. By 2006, the 
country was running large fi scal and cur-
rent account surpluses, namely, 15 per cent 
and 23 per cent of GDP, respectively. In-
ternational reserves had reached 8.6 billion 
U.S. dollars while the country’s external 
debt had dropped from 73 per cent of GDP 
in 2003 to only 16 per cent in 2007.
Oil exports and revenue have powered 
much of Angola’s success in recent years. 
But its economic recovery began, in fact, 
before its oil boom, based on the ad-
vent of peace. Surprisingly perhaps, the 
non-oil sector of the economy grew at an 
above-average clip of 17 per cent during 
2003-2007. By 2006, growth in the non-oil 
sector, led by trade, commerce and manu-
facturing, was about twice as fast as that in 
the oil sector (see Table). 
This success has been due, in part, to the 
government’s ability to maintain some 
measure of macroeconomic stability and 
enable its internally displaced population 
to resettle and revive economic activity.
While Angola should be lauded for its suc-
cess, the crucial challenge now confront-
ing the country is to shift its economy, 
over time, from oil-powered growth to a 
more diversifi ed and broad-based pattern 
of growth. 
The priorities also need to shift to generat-
ing widespread employment and substan-
tially reducing poverty.While economic 
growth has been impressive, dismal social 
trends have confi ned Angola to the bottom 
of the global rankings on human devel-
opment and poverty. Life expectancy, at 
about 42 years, is one of the lowest in the 
world while the under-fi ve mortality rate, 
at 250 deaths per 1,000 live births, is one 
of the highest. 
The latest poverty estimate for the country, 
which was in the early 2000s, calculated 
that about two-thirds of the population was 
poor and over one fourth was extremely 
poor. So it is imperative to scale up and 
frontload massive public investments in 
health, nutrition and education, as well as 
initiate a cash transfer programme to deal 
immediately with poverty.
Realising Angola’s Potential
Angola need not remain heavily dependent 
on oil for its prosperity. It is rich in many 
other natural resources. Diamonds are also
important, for example. Its fertile soils and 
vast water resources are also major advan-
tages. If the country invested substantially 
in agricultural development, it could 
become a prominent food exporter. 
It could also benefi t from developing its 
fi sheries and livestock. In addition, it could 
use its water resources to become a lead-
ing producer of hydroelectric power in the 
region. In order to realise its vast potential, 
particularly in its non-oil sectors, Angola 
will have to undertake large investments in 
basic economic and social infrastructure. 
But would such investments jeopardise 
macroeconomic stability?
Currently, the government maintains a rel-
atively cautious approach to fi scal expen-
ditures. Oil revenues account for roughly 
four-fi fths of total government revenue. So 
the government has established a refer-
ence price for oil and stipulated that any 
revenue arising from an oil price higher 
than the reference level cannot be spent, 
but instead should be deposited in an oil 
reserve fund for future use. 
Some Angolan offi cials would prefer a 
stricter rule, namely, that the level of pub-
lic expenditures per capita that is funded 
by oil revenue should remain constant for 
the future. The rationale is that when oil 
production ends, revenue could still fl ow 
from the resultant build-up of fi nancial 
assets.
However, given Angola’s current woe-
fully low level of human development 
and widespread poverty, such a fi scal rule 
would impose an unnecessarily rigid limit 
on government spending, which could not 
rise even in proportion to oil revenue. 
A better legacy to leave future Angolans 
than such dubious fi nancial wealth is 
a higher level of economic and social 
development, based on widespread public 
investments carried out while oil revenue 
is still plentiful, instead of when it ends. 
While oil revenues last, they should be 
ploughed into fi nancing an economic 
diversifi cation strategy that could broaden 
the future revenue base beyond oil. But 
some oil revenue would still need to be 
saved when oil prices are high in order 
to smooth fi scal expenditures when they 
drop, as is happening now.
Maintaining Macro Stability
If macroeconomic policies were properly 
managed, a scaling up of public invest-
ment in critical infrastructure should 
not be infl ationary. The government has 
already done well in utilising the exchange 
rate as its main stabilisation tool, instead 
of the money supply. As a result, CPI infl a-
tion had been brought down to low double 
digits by 2007.
2003 2004 2005 2006
Total GDP   3.3 11.2 20.6 18.6
Oil GDP  -2.2 13.1 26.0 13.1
Non-oil GDP  10.3  9.0 14.1 27.5
 Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing  12.1 14.1 17.0  9.8
 Diamonds  20.1  0.6 16.2 30.9
 Manufacturing  12.0 13.5 24.9 44.7
 Electricity and water  10.0 11.5 17.4 13.2
 Construction  12.5 14.0 16.9 30.0
 Trade and Commerce   9.9 10.4  8.5 38.1
 Nontradable Services   2.0  2.5 13.9 13.0
 
Source: IMF Article IV (2007).
           Real GDP Growth, for Total GDP and Selected Sectors
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From 1999 to early 2003, Angola’s sta-
bilisation programme had continuously 
depreciated the nominal exchange rate. 
While continuing to depreciate through 
most of 2005, this rate has more recently 
begun to appreciate (see Figure). 
Hence, the government should continue to 
manage the exchange rate in order to fore-
stall the weakening of the tradable sectors 
of the economy and the short-circuiting 
of its diversifi cation plans. Resorting to a 
fl exible exchange-rate regime, as orthodox 
adjustment policies often recommend, 
would likely impart more volatility to An-
gola’s currency, and thus greater instability 
to its economy.
Adopting the orthodox alternative of tar-
geting money supply growth is not likely 
to be effective either. The Angolan econ-
omy is very open, and highly dollarised, 
neutralising much of the potential effect 
of monetary policy. Moreover, its fi nancial 
system remains weak and underdeveloped 
and the economy as a whole is not well 
integrated or monetised. 
By pragmatically utilising the exchange 
rate as an infl ation anchor, the government 
has been able to bring down infl ation with-
out precipitating a sharp contraction in the 
economy. It should continue such policies 
for the foreseeable future.
But in order to maintain a stable currency, 
the government will also have to correct 
some malfunctioning of wholesale and 
retail markets, where oligopoly structures 
appear to be maintaining an artifi cially 
high level of prices. The channels for 
importing and domestically distributing 
goods are not operating effi ciently. For 
example, prices for the categories of cloth-
ing and footwear have risen sharply in 
recent years. However, these are tradable 
goods whose prices in Kwanza should 
have tracked the behaviour of the nomi-
nal exchange rate, which was maintained 
fairly stable during this period.
Over the longer term, one of the best
medium-term ‘hedges’ against infl ation is
greater public investment in infrastructure 
since the resultant public assets would 
help provide greater integration to markets 
across the country, expand the economy’s 
supply capacity and productivity and 
facilitate economic diversifi cation.
A Diversifi cation Strategy
A diversifi cation strategy for Angola 
should be comprised of three major 
components. One is public investment in 
economic and social infrastructure, which 
we have already mentioned. Another is the 
design of public policies that can stimulate 
the development of the agricultural sector, 
which has huge potential.
During the civil war, rural areas were ad-
versely affected by sizeable rural-to-urban 
migration of the population and the aban-
donment or destruction of much of the ru-
ral infrastructure. Agricultural production 
bounced back in the aftermath of a peace 
agreement but it has been constrained by 
poor infrastructure, such as a lack of trans-
port links and storage facilities. 
Productivity remains low due to several 
factors. Among the most prominent are the 
lack of fi nancing and the limited avail-
ability of rural extension services. Hence, 
building capacity in these areas is a high 
priority.
Boosting subsistence farming should be 
a priority, especially for reducing rural 
poverty. But the government should also 
promote more commercial farming so that 
the sector can become internationally com-
petitive and take advantage of the strong 
long-term global demand for agricultural 
products, refl ected, in part, by recent in-
creases in international food prices.
Since the oil sector has little capacity to 
generate employment, Angola’s diversifi -
cation strategy should prioritise the critical 
need to create decent jobs. This not only 
implies building up agriculture, which is 
labour-intensive, but also construction and 
manufacturing. 
However, since commercial farming dis-
places subsistence farming over time, agri-
culture’s capacity to generate employment 
will decrease. Hence, the urban manu-
facturing and service sectors will have to 
grow fast enough to absorb the country’s 
growing labour force and provide remu-
nerative employment.
Such a transition will imply more pub-
lic support to facilitating private-sector 
development. Maintaining a competi-
tive exchange rate will help, of course. 
Also, widespread public investment in 
infrastructure will be crucial. Providing 
incentives to sub-sectors with clear growth 
and employment potential could also 
contribute to success. This could apply, 
for example, to food processing activi-
ties, which could prosper on the basis of 
Angola’s agricultural development.
Concluding Remarks
The objective of Angola’s diversifi cation 
strategy should be to rely on its sizeable 
current pool of oil revenue to fi nance a 
broader basis for economic growth, pro-
ductive employment and effective poverty 
reduction. In the near term, an uncon-
ditional cash transfer programme could 
contribute directly to reducing poverty.
Over the medium term, however, broad-
based employment generation is more 
likely to ensure a sustainable increase in 
incomes and human development. For 
this purpose, the government will have to 
fi nance increased public investment and 
provide incentives for private-sector devel-
opment in those sectors and sub-sectors 
that not only possess discernible growth 
potential but also can provide decent 
employment.
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Trinidad and Tobago is benefi ting 
tremendously from its immense oil and 
gas reserves. However, a 2007 audit of the 
gas sector sent panic shocks all around. 
According to the audit report, current gas 
reserves will run out by 2019 (Ryder Scott, 
2007). The report stirred a debate on the 
future of the economy and the strategy to 
follow.
Energy production has been steadily 
increasing, from 12,612 kilotons in 1990 
to 31,399 kilotons in 2005 (see Figure next 
page). Currently energy exports comprise 
over 90 per cent of total exports. Tax rev-
enue obtained from the energy sector went 
up from TT$ 6,720 million in 2002/03 
to TT$ 24,069 million in 2005/06. By 
2004/05, revenue from this sector overtook 
that earned from the non-energy sector. 
Revenue from the non-energy sector, as 
a share of GDP, fell from 26 per cent in 
2004/05 to 24.4 per cent in 2005/06.
The value-added of the non-energy sec-
tor has also been in decline (see Table). 
Though Trinidad and Tobago is the manu-
facturing hub in the Caribbean region, the 
contribution of this sector fell from 7.3 
per cent of GDP in 2000 to 5.8 per cent 
in 2006. Value added in the service sector 
also fell, from 49.1 per cent to 37.7 per 
cent. All in all, the contribution of the non-
energy sector to GDP declined by about 24 
per cent between 2000 and 2006. 
A central problem is that Trinidad and
Tobago’s energy sector has not been able 
to create jobs. The sector remains highly 
capital-intensive, employing only four per 
cent of the working population. So the 
country’s unemployment rate has remained 
high, averaging nine per cent between 
2002 and 2006. 
The Oil and Non-Oil Sectors
The government is trying to counter the 
impact of the audit report in two ways. 
First, it claims that the report merely high-
lights the current stock of gas reserves. 
Therefore, panic is not warranted as long 
as further explorations take place. 
Second, the government has introduced a 
diversifi cation strategy. The plan is to start 
up large-scale farms and encourage the 
private sector to engage in food production 
and agro-processing. The strategy has also 
targeted growth of fi nancial services, in-
formation and communication technology, 
tourism and activities downstream from 
the energy sector to foster diversifi cation. 
Will the strategy of simultaneous explora-
tion of energy sources and sectoral diversi-
fi cation work? The audit report estimated, 
for instance, that 37 trillion cubic feet 
of gas is left to be explored. If, and only 
if, new oil and gas reserves are exploited 
might the country gain enough energy to 
sustain its economy up through mid cen-
tury. But this assumes a production rate of 
4.5 billion cubic feet per day. 
Energy experts highlight that the country 
is reaching its energy peak because of high 
exploration costs. The easy-to-explore gas 
and oil fi elds have already been prospect-
ed.The remaining ones could be smaller, 
further ashore and deeper in the sea. 
Hence, the big oil companies will need 
signifi cant tax breaks and other incen-
tives to undertake this expensive kind of 
exploration.
Also, successive governments have still 
not worked towards developing the non-
energy sector. Potentially holding back 
such development are emerging signs of 
the ‘Dutch Disease’ phenomenon. The 
country’s real exchange rate appreciated 
against the U.S. dollar by about 10 per 
cent between 2004 and 2006. This is partly 
due to depreciation of the U.S. dollar but 
is also driven by high demand for Trinidad 
and Tobago’s exports and the rise in its 
domestic interest rates.
The infl ation rate also rose from 4.3 per 
cent in 2002 to 5.6 per cent in 2004 and 
then to 9.1 per cent in 2006. The apprecia-
tion in the exchange rate signals widening 
price differentials between the country and 
its trading partners, which could lead to 
a further deterioration in the non-energy 
sector.
A Diversifi cation Strategy
What should Trinidad and Tobago do? 
Since the discovery of future energy sourc-
es is not guaranteed, the country needs to 
concentrate on a diversifi cation strategy. 
Policy makers could focus on two areas. 
The fi rst is an industrial policy to guide the 
diversifi cation plan. The second is a focus 
on increasing productivity, especially 
because of infl ationary pressure and real 
exchange rate appreciation, which restrain 
the revival of the non-energy sector.   
Public policy needs to focus on harmonis-
ing a domestic investment strategy with 
likely niches for Trinidad and Tobago in 
the international market. This would imply 
an industrial policy that is concerned with 
more than just correction of market fail-
ures. Such a policy should also go beyond 
simply indicating the sectors in which to 
diversify. 
It should include: a) protection of domestic 
markets from competing imports; b) 
Year    Agriculture Manufacturing     Services    Non-Energy    
      sectors
2000         1.4         7.3        49.1        57.9
2001         1.3         7.7        51.6        60.6
2002         1.5         8.3        53.7        63.5
2003         1.0         6.6        46.0        53.6
2004         1.0         7.0        43.9        51.8
2005         0.7         6.5        40.3        47.4
2006         0.6         5.8        37.7        44.2
         Sectoral Value Added (% of GDP)
Source: World Development Indicators (April 2008).
Trinidad and Tobago’s 
energy sector has not 
been able to create 
jobs. So the unem-
ployment rate has 
remained high.
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encouragement of the fi nancial sector to 
provide targeted and subsidised credit; 
c) tax incentives and subsidies for export 
promotion; and d) policies for technology 
and skills transfers. While there should be 
caution about generalising from global ex-
periences, the bulk of empirical evidence 
indicates that public intervention in 
the systematic mobilisation and allocation 
of industrial fi nance has played an impor-
tant role in transforming many successful 
economies.
Appreciation of the real exchange rate 
can be tackled through the coordination 
of macroeconomic policies. According to 
the government of Trinidad and Tobago 
and the IMF, “supply side constraints are 
one of the underlying causes of infl ation” 
(IMF 2008, p. 7). However, the govern-
ment’s policy response has been a focus 
on infl ation targeting, which has led to an 
undesirable rise in the policy interest rate 
from 6.7 per cent in 2003 to 8.25 per cent 
in 2008. This can contribute to further ap-
preciation.
By coordinating fi scal and monetary 
instruments, policy makers could stimu-
late more vigorous supply responses. For 
instance, lower interest rates could be used 
to improve access to credit and ‘crowd in’ 
private investment. 
The current boom in the energy sector 
could also be utilised to fi nance public 
investments in sectors where signifi cant 
productivity gains could be made. 
Concentrating on increasing gas and oil 
exploration might appear to be an attrac-
tive option. Nevertheless, diversifi cation 
of the economy, driven by industrial policy 
and supply-side measures, will lead to 
more sustainable growth and generate 
more broad-based and productive employ-
ment. 
The views expressed in this article are 
the authors’ and not necessarily those of 
UNDP.
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tant role in transform-









































Yemen is a poor country that ap-
peared in recent years to have the op-
portunity to escape from its poverty trap 
through becoming a signifi cant exporter 
of oil. However, while its exports surely 
benefi ted from the recent oil price boom, 
its imports suffered gravely from escalat-
ing food prices. How can Yemen overcome 
this long-term dilemma?
From 2003 to 2006, because of rising oil 
income, central government revenue was 
progressively increasing—reaching a high 
of about 38 per cent of GDP by 2006. 
Based on continuous current account 
surpluses, Yemen’s gross offi cial reserves 
had reached a pinnacle of almost seven per 
cent of GDP by 2006, equivalent to almost 
a year of imports. The country appeared 
to have ample ‘fi scal space’ to tackle its 
development problems.
But in 2006 the country also began to 
face rising prices for imported food. This 
reinforced an underlying domestic upward 
trend of food prices attributable to low ag-
ricultural productivity. Between December 
2006 and December 2007, the price index 
for food increased by 11 per cent, with the 
price of imported wheat jumping by 60 
per cent. And food prices increased by a 
further 11 per cent between January and 
March 2008.
Analysts have argued, however, that this 
price index seriously understated the 
degree of increase in the cost of food. For 
example, a loaf of bread remained the 
same price while its weight was being cut 
in half. Violent protests started erupting in 
2007 in response to rising food costs, ex-
acerbated by widespread unemployment, 
which had reached over 16 per cent by end 
2006. While the labour force was grow-
ing rapidly, the oil-driven economy could 
deliver only sluggish employment growth.
From 1998 to 2005-6, extreme income 
poverty in Yemen declined from over 20 
per cent of the population to 12.5 per cent 
and overall income poverty from 40 to 35 
per cent. But because of recent consumer 
price increases, extreme income poverty 
roughly doubled from 2005-6 to December 
2007, i.e., to 27 per cent; and overall pov-
erty increased from 35 to 54 per cent. Over 
60 per cent of the population in rural areas 
was poor at the end of 2007. Since food 
prices continued to escalate thereafter, 
poverty rates are bound to be signifi cantly 
higher in 2008.
Reviving Agriculture
How could Yemen have avoided such a 
severe food shock? About 20 years ago, it 
was self-suffi cient in food. But it has since 
allowed its food production to decline, 
and is now 75-95 per cent dependent on 
imports of key food staples. 
Reviving agriculture is vital to boosting 
Yemen’s development prospects. However, 
a small number of large landowners have 
appropriated most of the land and mo-
nopolised access to irrigation. And instead 
of growing grains, they have specialised 
in more profi table crops such as Qat, fruits 
and vegetables. Encouraged by subsidies 
for irrigation pumps and diesel fuel, they 
have been largely responsible for depleting 
the country’s scarce water resources. Qat 
alone consumes about 30 per cent of all 
irrigation water. 
Agricultural prosperity is crucial to 
poverty reduction in Yemen since about 
three-quarters of the poor reside in rural 
areas, with their livelihoods tied closely 
to agriculture. But for such prosperity to 
have any impact on poverty, access to land 
and water would have to become more 
equitable. 
Government investment in a range of 
public goods in rural areas would also 
be essential, particularly in order to raise 
land productivity. The rise in productivity 
would contribute to a long-term decline in 
domestic food prices. 
             
               Yemen: Caught between 
            Rising Oil and Food Prices
        
Does Yemen have suffi cient resources to 
fi nance diversifi cation of its economy? 
While oil revenue has provided it with a 
window of opportunity to catapult itself 
out of least developed country status, this 
window is currently shrinking. Output is 
beginning to decline, as are exports. While 
oil revenue dropped to about 22 per cent of 
GDP in 2007, it was projected to rebound 
to about 27 per cent in 2008 because of 
rising global oil prices (see Table next 
page).  
Mobilising Resources
However, the country’s oil is projected 
to be depleted by 2018 unless current 
exploration locates new deposits. This is 
certainly possible. Moreover, exploitation 
of new liquefi ed gas reserves is helping to 
offset the decline in oil resources. 
Meanwhile, typical of resource-rich coun-
tries, the government has made little effort 
to raise non-oil revenue. As of 2007, such 
revenue represented only about eight per 
cent of GDP while oil revenue represented 
22 per cent. After a long delay, the govern-
ment fi nally introduced a General Sales 
Tax in 2007 but with concessions granted 
on the valuation of imports. 
At the same time, about one fi fth of gov-
ernment expenditures have been allocated 
to maintain fuel subsidies, which dispro-
portionately benefi t richer households. 
So, while the government needs to make 
more concerted efforts, over the medium 
term, to raise non-oil revenue, it should 
also redirect expenditures away from such 
subsidies. 
Such a re-allocation of expenditures could 
help fi nance greater public investment 
in the non-oil sectors of the economy, 
providing more diversifi ed and sustainable 
sources of growth and employment. In the 
short term, public expenditures also need 
to be urgently re-allocated to the direct 
provisioning of food to poor households 
and to general food subsidies.
Donor pledges of US$ fi ve billion, made 
originally at the Consultative Group 
meeting in November 2006, could help 
Yemen make the investment necessary to 
revive agriculture and diversify its sources 
of growth. The disbursement of such an 
amount could cover, for example, 85 per 
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cent of the country’s Public Investment 
Program during 2007-2010. Some easing 
of Yemen’s external debt burden could 
also help its fi nancial condition.
Yemen could also redirect a share of its 
large stock of foreign-exchange reserves to 
encourage the import of capital goods as 
a spur to domestic investment. So, public 
resources are currently or potentially avail-
able to spur development. What is lacking 
is the ability to mobilise private resources. 
While the government has been scaling up 
its public investment in recent years, fi nan-
cial liberalisation has done little to boost 
domestic savings or stimulate private 
investment. The ratio of private savings to 
GDP has been in marked decline since its 
peak of over 20 per cent in 1998. And only 
about a quarter of bank loans are directed 
to the private sector, with most of them 
going to trading activities. It is no surprise 
that private investment has been in sharp 
decline since 1998, falling to less than 10 
per cent in the early 2000s, even as public 
investment has been on the rise. 
So, reforming fi nancial-sector policies and 
incentives are critical. The government 
needs to shape the incentives facing the 
domestic banking system to encourage it 
to provide loans for private investment to 
the sectors with growth potential.
Promoting Diversifi cation
Unable to fi nance diversifi ed sources of 
growth, Yemen has become heavily de-
pendent on oil, which has risen to account 
for about three-quarters of government 
revenue and over 90 per cent of export 
receipts. In recent years, oil has tripled 
its share of GDP to well over one third. 
Thus, Yemen exhibits some of the classic 
features of a ‘Resource Curse’, with the 
abundance of oil acting, in effect, to divert 
resources from other productive sectors.
Predictably, agriculture has declined in 
importance, from over 24 per cent of GDP 
in 1990 to about 10 per cent in 2005. 
Manufacturing has also shrivelled, from 
about 19 per cent to only about seven per 
cent. A low-paid, low-skilled urban service
 sector, increasingly tied to oil instead of 
agriculture and manufacturing, continues 
to account for about 40 per cent of GDP—
and for much of urban poverty. 
In the process, Yemen’s rate of economic 
growth has progressively declined, i.e., 
from over six per cent per year in the early 
1990s to a little over fi ve per cent in the 
late 1990s and then to about 4.5 per cent in 
the early 2000s. The growth rate dropped 
to 3.2 per cent in 2006 and was projected 
to remain at that level in 2007, due prin-
cipally to a projected yearly decline in oil 
production.
But Yemen is not fated to suffer a ‘Re-
source Curse’. If it is politically stable, its 
geographical position and its cultural herit-
age could help diversify its economy away 
from a heavy reliance on oil. Tourism and 
its strategically placed port services could 
play a role in this regard. Currently, the 
most important non-oil sector in the coun-
try is the fi shing industry, which has been 
growing rapidly in recent years.
Fostering investment in the domestic 
processing of fi sh could generate, for 
example, substantial additional national in-
come. While manufacturing exports have 
been confi ned mostly to a narrow range 
of food and animal products, processing 
of fi sh is an example of how the manu-
facturing base could be broadened. But 
manufacturing alone is unlikely to drive 
economic growth. Yemen’s economic 
strategy should be to stimulate a range of 
promising subsectors across manufactur-
ing, services and agriculture.
Radical trade liberalisation has made 
Yemen one of the most open economies in 
the MENA region, but it has delivered few 
tangible economic benefi ts. In response, 
public investment needs to be deployed to 
alleviate critical supply-side constraints. If 
properly designed, such public investment 
should be able to stimulate private invest-
ment, not ‘crowd it out’, as neoliberal 
economists often fear.
Yemen is not suffering from some of 
the macroeconomic symptoms routinely 
associated with a ‘Resource Curse’, such 
as an overheated economy and a grossly 
overvalued exchange rate. Because it has 
widespread unemployment and underem-
ployment, there has been only moderate 
infl ation in non-tradable sectors, such as 
services and construction. The supply of 
low-skilled labour can readily respond to 
any increase in oil-fi nanced demand.
The current increases in infl ation, par-
ticularly in food price infl ation, have their 
domestic structural roots in the lack of 
investment in low-productivity agriculture 
and the intra-sectoral diversion of resourc-
es from the cultivation of grains. Channel-
ling public investment to boost agricultural 
productivity will help Yemen mitigate the 
effects of a rising food import bill.
Most of Yemen’s current problems can be 
traced to the underlying structural features 
of its underdevelopment as a least devel-
oped country. Its export of oil recently 
provided it with a windfall of resources to 
overcome these deep-seated problems. If 
such resources were strategically man-
aged, a supposed ‘Resource Curse’ could 
be turned into a blessing. 
But for this prospect to be realized, 
Yemen’s energy resources need to be in-
tensively ploughed into public and private 
investment. Yemen needs to transform 
its endowment of natural capital into a 
rapid accumulation of productive physi-
cal capital that will provide a broad and 
diversifi ed foundation for accelerating 
economic growth, employment generation 
and poverty reduction. 
The views expressed in this article are 
the authors’ and not necessarily those of 
UNDP.
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          2006            2007        2008 (proj.)
Crude Oil Output
(million bbls)
         133.3           116.7           113.1
Crude Oil Exports
(million bbls)
         105.5            82.1            77.0
Oil Revenue 
(% of GDP)
          28.9            22.1            27.3
 Source: World Bank, Yemen Economic Updates, 2007, 2008.
        Yemen’s Oil Output, Exports and Revenue
Yemen’s geographical 
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heritage could help 
diversify its economy 
away from a heavy re-
liance on oil. Tourism 
and its strategically 
placed port services 
could play a role in 
this regard.
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Oil windfalls are generally con-
sidered more of a ‘resource curse’ than a 
blessing. The growth experience in Ven-
ezuela since the discovery of oil in 1920 
provides an opportunity to examine the va-
lidity of the ‘resource curse’ paradigm. By 
1928, Venezuela was one of the largest oil 
producers and exporters in the world and 
has remained an important oil economy 
ever since. But especially in the non-oil 
sector, its growth has slowed considerably 
in the post-1980 period (see Table).
Average annual growth did recover in the 
period 2004-7, with non-oil GDP grow-
ing at over 10 per cent and manufacturing 
growing at 13 per cent. Such high growth 
rates were the result of dramatic increases 
in oil export revenues in the aftermath of 
four years of signifi cant declines in eco-
nomic growth.
There are two main theories that attempt to 
explain why oil abundance can harm long-
term economic growth. First, ‘Dutch Dis-
ease’ models posit that oil booms produce 
exchange-rate revaluations. This reduces 
the incentives to invest in manufacturing 
and generally makes manufacturing output 
uncompetitive internationally. 
While economic models of the ‘resource 
curse’ are consistent with the co-existence 
of the slowdown in manufacturing growth 
in Venezuela during the oil booms in the 
1970s and early 1980s, the longer-run 
correlation of oil resource availability and 
manufacturing investment and growth in 
twentieth-century Venezuela is not robust. 
Oil abundance has coincided during the 
whole period of 1920-2005 with long 
periods of both rapid growth (1930-1980) 
and stagnation (1980-2005). 
The second main theory for an adverse 
impact of resource abundance is the rentier 
state model, which draws on the theories 
of rent-seeking and corruption. Its main 
contention is that oil abundance induces 
overly centralised public authority and 
excessive state interventionism and discre-
tion, which, in turn, causes growth- and 
productivity-restricting corruption and 
rent-seeking. However, this proposition 
is not supported by comparative evidence 
across countries or the historical evidence 
of Venezuela itself. Similar levels of 
state centralisation and corruption have 
coincided with cycles of both growth and 
stagnation in Venezuela and elsewhere 
(Khan, 2006). 
Variations in Performance
Why has the use of oil rents been both 
more and less growth- and productivity-
enhancing over time? The reigning 
explanations of Venezuela’s growth slow-
down do not examine the extent to which 
different development strategies and stages 
of import-substitution affect the ability 
of national policy-makers to implement 
industrial policies. 
The historical evidence on Venezuela sug-
gests that its process of industrialisation 
involved two very different strategies over 
time. The period from the early 1900s to 
the late 1960s was one of ‘easy’ import-
substitution industrialisation (ISI), in 
which infant industry production tended to 
be technologically simple and small-scale, 
and major coordination of investment 
by the state was not essential for rapid 
growth. 
The post-1968 period is characterised by 
a switch in the development strategy to-
wards  more advanced import substitution 
industrialisation focused on intermediate 
goods and heavy industry. 
This strategy also involved a ‘big push’ to 
develop natural resource-based industries. 
What distinguishes the advanced ISI/big 
push strategy from the ‘easy ISI’ strategy 
is that advanced import substitution tends 
to be more technologically demanding, 
larger-scale, longer-gestating, and more in 
need of major coordination of large-scale 
investments by the state and the private 
sector.
The Role of Political Dynamics
This distinction between the two types of 
development strategy matters for un-
derstanding the growth trajectory of the 
Venezuelan economy. Di John (forthcom-
ing) argues that the more advanced ISI 
strategies require a polity that is capable 
of centralising coordination of investments 
and effectively monitoring the deployment 
of infant industry subsidies. 
This requirement means, in turn, that 
large-scale fragmentation of political 
organisations and the state and major 
disagreements over policy among contend-
ing political parties, factions of capital and 
labor unions are likely to negatively affect 
productivity and output growth, particu-
larly in the manufacturing sector. 
There is, in fact, no reason to expect that 
the appropriate institutional structure and 
politics will necessarily emerge to accom-
modate a country’s stage of development 
and its changing technological challenges. 
So a theory is needed that helps explain 
how economic performance in Venezuela 
depends on the extent to which develop-
ment strategies and political settlements 
have been compatible over time. 
                
                          Venezuela: 
             From Windfall to Curse?
        by Jonathan Di John, Department of Development Studies, SOAS
     Non-oil GDP     Manufacturing
1920-30           10.2            n.a
1930-40            2.7            n.a
1940-50            9.6            6.6
1950-60            9.1           15.0
1960-70            7.1            7.7
1970-80            5.7            9.7
1980-90            1.1            2.8
1990-98            2.7            1.2
1998-03           -3.5           -5.1
Growth Trends in the Non-Oil Venezuelan Economy, 1920-2003
(average annual growth rates, %)
Source: Di John (forthcoming)
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Drawing on the rich political science 
literature on Venezuela helps us distin-
guish two broad types of salient polities in 
Venezuela over the period 1920-2005. 
In the twentieth century, Venezuela can 
reasonably be characterised as a con-
solidated state in the sense that it has 
maintained a monopoly over the means 
of coercion and has been able to maintain 
political and social order for most of this 
period. However, the nature of political 
organisation and competition has changed 
substantially over the course of the twenti-
eth century. 
A consolidated state, as the political 
literature in Venezuela corroborates, has 
coincided with two very different types of 
political organisation and contestation: a 
consolidated state with centralised political 
organisations and a consolidated state with 
fragmented (and increasingly polarised) 
political organisations.
Consider the growth prospects of poli-
ties that are generally characterised by a 
consolidated state with centralised politi-
cal organisations. Such a type of polity 
characterized Venezuela during most of 
the period 1920-1968.
Under this type, patronage structures are 
controlled by the executive in a centralised 
fashion. The deployment of patronage 
could take place under a cohesive military 
regime, under a centralised one-party state 
or through a high degree of cooperation 
between two contending political parties. 
Generally, these type of polities are most 
likely to both promote economic growth 
through the early stage of ISI and meet the 
political and economic challenges of big 
push/advanced ISI development strategies.
In contrast, the growth prospects are less 
sanguine for a consolidated state with frag-
mented political organisations–a situation 
that is common in many less developed 
countries and characterised the Venezuelan 
polity during 1968-2005. In such polities, 
patronage structures are less coherent and 
predictable. 
These types of polities may be capable of 
generating relatively rapid growth when 
attempting to implement early-stage ISI 
strategies. But they are much less likely 
to successfully manage the more diffi cult 
economic and political challenges of big 
push/advanced ISI development strategies.
 
An Alternative Explanation
The historical mapping of development 
strategies and political settlements helps 
provide an alternative explanation of Vene-
zuelan growth and productivity. During the 
period 1920-1968, there was rapid growth 
in manufacturing output and respectable 
productivity growth because there was 
basic compatibility between the 
development strategy (early ISI strategies) 
and politics (a consolidated state with 
centralised political organisations). 
In contrast, the period 1968-2005 is 
characterised by rapid declines of growth 
in non-oil and manufacturing productivity 
(see Rodriguez, 2006)), and by a col-
lapse in growth in the sub-period 1980-
2003. The reason is that there was a basic 
incompatibility between the development 
strategy (a more advanced ISI and a ‘big 
push’ for a natural resource-based indus-
trial strategy) and the country’s politics (a 
consolidated state with increasingly frag-
mented and eventually polarised political 
organisations).
In the period 1968-2005, the Venezuelan 
political system became increasingly 
populist, ‘clientelist’ and factionalised at 
the same time as the development strategy 
and stage of import-substitution required a 
more unifi ed and cohesive system. Such a 
break-down was closely related to efforts 
by the dominant political parties to pre-
serve democratic rule and prevent a return 
to the authoritarianism that reigned during 
most of the fi rst half of the twentieth 
century. 
The resultant coordination failures of 
the big-push industrialisation strategy 
were manifested in the low monitoring of 
state-created rents and subsidies, excessive 
entry of private sector fi rms into protected 
economic sectors, and massive prolif-
eration of public-sector employment and 
state-owned enterprises in a more decen-
tralised and weakened public sector.
The alternative framework of analysis 
that is proposed here helps explain why 
resource abundance can sometimes be 
a ‘curse’ and at other times a ‘blessing’. 
The Venezuelan case, far from being 
‘exceptional’, is relevant for re-thinking 
the political economy of the ‘resource 
curse’ in many export-oriented developing 
countries.
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Uzbekistan represents an interesting 
case of a transition economy that remains 
reliant on an abundance of primary com-
modities to drive its economic growth. 
Yet it is also noteworthy for its strategy 
of gradual transition from state socialism 
to a market-based economy and for its 
extended period of import substitution. 
This article argues that, as a result, it has 
greater capacity than many other emerging 
economies to manage the consequences of 
an export boom.
Starting in the early 1990s, Uzbekistan 
has actively attempted to restructure its 
economy, primarily through substituting 
domestic production for imports. Early 
in the 1990s, cotton exports represented 
about half of its export value while about 
60 per cent of its petroleum was imported 
from the Soviet Union. 
But the country became self-suffi cient in 
oil within a few years by developing oil 
resources that had remained unexploited 
during the Soviet period. It also mounted 
a campaign to become more self-suffi cient 
in grains, achieving about 90 per cent 
self-suffi ciency by the early 2000s based 
on converting land from cotton to grain 
production.
Setbacks to Trade
Such developments were fortuitous since 
Uzbekistan began to suffer severe external 
shocks to its trade in the late 1990s. Cot-
ton production plunged by 15 per cent in 
1996 and experienced sharp oscillations 
thereafter. 
The world price of cotton also fell to about 
43 per cent of its 1995 level by 2001. The 
sharp depreciation of the Russian rouble, 
due to that country’s 1998 fi nancial crisis, 
compounded Uzbekistan’s problems by 
making its exports to its main trading 
partner much more expensive.
In response, Uzbek policymakers tight-
ened controls on the currency and trade re-
gime and focused on compressing imports 
in order to maintain a trade balance. Their 
continuing import substitution policies 
also succeeded in reducing the country’s 
heavy reliance on cotton exports by laying 
the basis for increasing non-traditional 
exports.
During the early 2000s, Uzbekistan 
experienced moderate rates of economic 
growth. But its rate of growth jumped 
from a yearly average of roughly four per 
cent during 2000-2003 to over seven per 
cent during 2004-2007. In 2007, its growth 
rate reached 9.5 per cent (and had been 
projected to average over eight per cent 
during 2008-2010).
This acceleration of growth is attributable 
to an export boom, powered by increases 
in cotton, energy and gold exports. The 
country’s current account balance reached 
almost 24 per cent of GDP by 2007. This 
dramatic improvement has been due to a 
rise in the world prices for its exports—as 
well as increased remittances from work-
ers who have emigrated to neighbouring 
CIS countries.
Is Uzbekistan Vulnerable?
Is Uzbekistan now vulnerable to the 
dynamics of a ‘Resource Curse’, i.e., fi rst 
experiencing a boom in the exports of 
primary commodities and then an inevita-
ble bust? The projected slowdown in the 
global economy, precipitated by a U.S. 
recession, will surely be an important fac-
tor, if mainly indirectly. 
Global demand for Uzbekistan’s cotton 
and other primary-commodity exports is 
likely to slow.
However, the composition of Uzbekistan’s 
exports and imports has been improving. 
Between the two periods 1995-1999 and 
2003-2006, the share of its exports com-
posed of cotton, gold and energy decreased 
from about three-quarters to less than 
two-thirds (see Table). While the share of 
gold rose by about 10 percentage points, 
the share of cotton exports was cut in half. 
An encouraging sign was the rise in the 
share of ‘Other Exports’ (excluding cotton, 
gold and energy) by almost 12 percentage 
points, to about 37 per cent.
Meanwhile, Uzbekistan was able to 
increase its import share of machinery to 
about 47 per cent. Most importantly, it was 
able to more than halve the import share of 
food, to less than 10 per cent, and to hold 
the import share of energy to about four 
per cent.
This signifi es that Uzbekistan is in a much 
stronger position than many other emerg-
ing economies. It is not acutely vulnerable 
to the recent rise in prices of food and en-
ergy. Its long-standing efforts to substitute 
domestic production for such imports have 
paid off.
Structural Constraints
In spite of these achievements, Uzbekistan 
could be adversely affected by the project-
ed global slowdown in growth, particularly 
through the knock-on effects of a reduc-
tion in Russian energy exports. 
    
    Uzbekistan: From Import Substitution        
                     to Export Boom    
by Terry McKinley, Director, Centre for Development Policy and Research
        1995-1999          2003-2006
Exports (%)
   Cotton             42.1              20.6
   Gold             18.2              28.6
   Energy             14.3              13.8
   Other             25.4              37.1
Imports (%)
   Food             21.5               9.1
   Energy              1.0               4.1
   Machinery             42.8              47.3
   Other             34.7              39.6
Shares of Exports and Imports, 1995-1998 and 2003-2006 (%)
Source: Country Study #12, International Poverty Centre
Uzbekistan has greater 
capacity than many 
other emerging econo-
mies to manage the 
consequences of an 
export boom.
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While Uzbekistan’s export-led growth has 
reached 8-9 per cent per year, such rates 
were not likely to be sustainable even 
if favourable conditions had continued. 
Its levels of investment, both public and 
private, are too low. Since 2002, its share 
of gross investment in GDP has remained 
stuck in the 19-20 per cent range. 
Given reasonable assumptions about 
Uzbekistan’s marginal capital-output ratio, 
its investment to GDP ratio would have to 
rise to 25 per cent just to sustain a six per 
cent annual rate of economic growth.
Hence, this structural constraint implies 
putting a premium on converting the 
current gains from trade into increased 
domestic investment. Measured as a ratio 
to GDP, domestic savings has exceeded 
domestic investment by 7-10 percentage 
points since 2002. So Uzbekistan is not 
constrained by a lack of domestic savings 
but by an inability to mobilise savings to 
fi nance investment.
Uzbek policymakers have to deploy a 
range of policies to boost domestic invest-
ment. Their fi scal policies should focus on 
augmenting public investment in strategic 
infrastructure that will help ‘crowd-in’ 
private investment. The resources for 
fi nancing increased public investment 
are available, e.g., derivable from the 
resources freed up by the reduction of 
Uzbekistan’s external debt or the redeploy-
ment of its large stock of foreign-exchange 
reserves.
Uzbekistan also has a credible revenue 
base. Its gains from trade have not lulled it 
into neglecting the mobilisation of public 
revenue. While brought down from over 
30 per cent in the 1990s, Uzbekistan’s 
revenue to GDP ratio still stood at about 
25 per cent in the early 2000s. In recent 
years, the budget has remained roughly in 
balance and the country’s debt burden has 
notably declined. The one concern is infl a-
tion but it has remained within a moderate 
range of 10-15 per cent.
The real challenge for Uzbekistan is to 
channel domestic savings into productive 
private investment. In the long term, this 
hinges on reforming the fi nancial system. 
But in the medium term, the state will 
have to play the leading role, such as 
implementing an industrial policy to guide 
the allocation of resources to internation-
ally competitive sectors of the economy 
that have the potential to both grow and 
generate productive employment. An 
investment bank, fi nanced in part by rents 
from Uzbekistan’s natural resource booms, 
could play a central role in such a strategy.
By adopting such an economic strategy, 
Uzbekistan could turn its current export 
boon to its long-term advantage. It has 
the advantage of a diversifi ed range of 
exportable commodities (gold, energy and 
cotton) and could continue diversifying 
into non-traditional exports. On the import 
side, its early import substitution policies 
have allowed it to mitigate the impact of 
the severe food and fuel price shocks rav-
aging many other emerging and develop-
ing economies. 
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It is generally recognised that during 
export booms, resource-rich countries can 
often face the problem of upward pressure 
on their nominal exchange rate, which 
is typically combined with infl ationary 
pressures that worsen the tendency to 
real appreciation. Both problems require 
coordinated macroeconomic management 
to contain such negative effects. 
It is also extremely important that fi scal 
policies be designed to reap the benefi ts 
of a boom in revenue in order to fi nance 
public investment and support private 
investment. Too many resource-rich—and 
otherwise poor—countries have handed 
out lavish tax concessions in order to at-
tract foreign investors. 
Coordinating exchange-rate and monetary 
policies is crucial. Floating exchange-rate 
regimes and restrictive infl ation-targeting 
monetary policies are usually counter-
productive in such a context. And trade 
liberalisation and open capital accounts 
only make matters worse.
Because of the pressure for currency ap-
preciation, managing the exchange rate is 
particularly important. Also, since expecta-
tions of appreciation can encourage short-
term speculative capital infl ows, a useful 
policy complement is capital-account 
regulation. In such a context, raising inter-
est rates to dampen infl ation could well 
intensify such volatile infl ows.
Combining deregulation of the capital 
account and a fl oating exchange rate with 
monetary policies that are fi xated on 
maintaining low infl ation is a recipe for a 
Dutch disease disaster. Yet, it is precisely 
these worst-case options that orthodox 
macroeconomic policy often insists on 
adopting. 
The Making of a Curse
Unfortunately, Zambia, which enjoys large 
deposits of copper, has suffered from the 
imposition of precisely such counter-pro-
ductive policy orthodoxy. After 2004, cop-
per prices more than doubled. In response, 
Zambia was encouraged to have no capital 
controls, institute low trade tariffs and 
adopt a fl exible exchange rate.  
In nominal terms, Zambia’s exchange rate 
appreciated by 30 per cent by the end of 
the second quarter of 2008 compared to its 
level in the fi rst quarter of 2005. This was 
over 50 per cent in real terms (see Figure). 
In Zambia, the IMF and the World Bank 
made a number of critical mistakes in 
their policy recommendations. During 
the 1980s, the country’s copper produc-
tion fell dramatically, almost to zero in 
the early 1990s. Meanwhile, radical trade 
liberalisation contributed to the collapse of 
its domestic manufacturing. With copper 
employment approaching nil and manufac-
turing jobs disappearing, urban poverty in 
one of Africa’s least rural countries rose 
dramatically. 
During the 1990s, a process of copper 
privatisation began, managed by the World 
Bank.  The privatisation sales included 
extremely liberal tax exemptions, implying 
that any ensuing recuperation in copper 
prices would generate little revenue for the 
public sector. However, copper prices did 
recover, beyond the wildest hopes of the 
companies, but this occurred in the worst 
possible context for the government. 
The Predictable Effects
The combination of a substantial apprecia-
tion of the Kwacha, as indicated in the 
Figure, and a liberalised trading regime 
served to undercut Zambia’s agricultural 
production. Simultaneously, the zeal-
ously pursued anti-infl ationary policy of 
the central bank limited access to credit. 
This constrained growth in the non-copper 
sectors of the economy and blocked effec-
tive interventions in the foreign-exchange 
market to dampen appreciation. 
Moreover, Zambia’s government received 
little initial fi scal benefi t from the copper
boom, because of the tax concessions that 
it had been forced to concede, and thus it 
had to operate under severe expenditure 
limits set by the IMF.
If ever there was a failure foretold, it was 
in Zambia after 1990. A government suf-
fering from a severe revenue constraint 
was pressed to accept copper privatisation 
that liberated companies from taxation. 
Moreover, a country that had an underde-
veloped agricultural sector, due originally 
to the colonial division of labour in British 
Central Africa, found itself operating with 
the lowest agricultural tariffs in the region. 
Zambia’s high interest-rate monetary 
policy ensured that productive investments 
would be unprofi table if fi nanced domesti-
cally. And, fi nally, a rapidly appreciating 
exchange rate undermined non-copper 
tradables and substantially reduced the 
domestic currency equivalent of the major 
sources of government income, namely, 
trade-related taxes and offi cial develop-
ment assistance.
The experience of Zambia suggests that 
if developing countries endowed with 
abundant resources suffer from a ‘resource 
curse’, the spell is not necessarily cast 
by inexorable forces, but by seriously 
misguided economic policies. And for the 
curse to be lifted, such policies have to be 
abandoned.
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The economies of both Chile and 
Zambia have long been dominated by the 
production and export of copper. Copper 
still constitutes 40 per cent of Chile’s total 
exports and 70 per cent of Zambia’s. But 
there are signifi cant differences in how the 
two countries have been able to reap the 
benefi ts of revenue from copper exports. 
Chile has been able to carefully manage its 
copper revenues while Zambia has been 
much less successful.
The ownership structure of copper mining 
in both countries has been an important 
factor in explaining the differences in 
their economic performance. A related 
factor has been the ability of each country 
to both raise and manage public revenue 
from copper exports. In both countries, the 
copper industry had been nationalised in 
the early 1970s but the end result for each 
country in the 2000s has been substantially 
different.
Despite the coup in 1973, the Chilean state 
maintained monopoly ownership over 
most of the copper mines. The share of 
public ownership was gradually reduced 
from 85 per cent in the 1970s to 39 per 
cent in 2006. At that point, large private 
mines accounted for about half of the 
ownership while small private mines ac-
counted for the remaining 10 per cent.
But Chile’s state-owned company, 
CODELCO, is still the largest producer 
of copper in the world and holds about 
one fi fth of the world’s copper reserves. It 
also contributes most of the tax revenue 
from copper, paying a tax rate of about 29 
per cent on the fi nal price. Unfortunately, 
private mining fi rms enjoy a very low tax 
rate of about fi ve per cent. Hence, Chile 
still loses a lot of potential tax revenue. A 
rough estimate for the period 1990-2001 
calculated a loss of revenue of over US$ 
10 billion.
Loss of Tax Revenue
The loss of potential tax revenue is, how-
ever, much more pronounced in Zambia. 
In the 1990s, as its industry continued to 
languish because of low copper prices, the 
country resorted, in desperation, to drastic 
privatisation of the mines. Between 1997 
and 2000, Zambia’s state-owned company, 
ZCCM, was split up into seven differ-
ent units and sold off to multinationals at 
bargain-basement prices. 
Although the Zambia state has retained 
a nominal share in each copper company 
(which accounted for about 10 per cent of 
the total industry in 2007), it has, so far, 
received no dividends from such owner-
ship. Moreover, it had followed the faulty 
advice of international fi nancial institu-
tions in granting many hefty tax conces-
sions to these companies when the mines 
were privatised. 
A recent study by Fraser and Lungu (2007) 
has found that the mining fi rms pay an 
effective rate of only 0.6 per cent in royal-
ties (although the nominal rate is 2.5 per 
cent). The resultant loss in royalties in 
2007 alone would amount to about US$ 
50 million. Also, the mining fi rms benefi t 
from being granted deductions of 100 per 
cent on capital expenditures and being 
exempted from paying customs or excise 
duties. In addition, they are allowed to 
carry forward any losses for 15-20 years 
and can claim a refund on all the value 
added taxes that they pay on goods locally 
purchased.
As a result, although Zambia’s copper 
revenues, in absolute terms, more than 
doubled between 2001 and 2006, i.e., 
during the copper boom, its revenues 
fell as a share of GDP (See Figure). The 
government was unable to take advantage 
of the copper boom because of the many 
tax concessions that it had granted. The 
opposite has been the case in Chile, where 
copper revenues rose steadily after 2003 to 
reach over 25 per cent of GDP in 2006.
Fortunately, having recognised its past pol-
icy mistakes, Zambia recently increased 
taxation of its copper industry, which has 
been exceedingly profi table, and expects to 
receive larger revenues in fi scal year 2008. 
Fiscal management has differed in the two 
countries. Zambia has been running fi scal 
defi cits since 2001, in large part because 
it has foregone much of the potential 
revenue that it could have reaped from the 
copper mines. 
Chile deliberately plans for a yearly 
budget surplus equal to one per cent of 
GDP, based largely on its projection of 
medium-term copper prices. The govern-
ment then channels this surplus, in the 
form of investment in foreign assets, into 
an Economic and Social Fund and a Pen-
sion Reserve Fund. 
Saving Export Revenue
This mechanism allows the government 
to save export revenue for future uses, 
especially in the event of a plunge in cop-
per prices. Such an approach also enables 
the government to avoid appreciation of its 
exchange rate—which is a common symp-
tom of the so-called ‘Dutch Disease’. 
The contrasting experiences of Chile and 
Zambia point to the desirability of main-
taining a signifi cant share of public 
ownership of mining industries when 
they account for a large proportion of a 
developing country’s export revenue. Such 
ownership has the potential not only of 
generating greater fi scal revenues than 
private multinational ownership but also 
of enabling precautionary saving of such 
revenue for future use in the event of 
plummeting international prices. 
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In Brazil, there has been widespread 
concern about both the level and the 
fl uctuations of the exchange rate. Real ex-
change rates oscillate more in developing 
countries than in developed ones (Eichen-
green and Hausmann 2005). Such a pattern 
concerns heterodox economists because of 
their belief that an undervalued and stable 
real exchange rate can contribute to a 
virtuous circle that links together exports, 
investment and growth, and is particularly 
important for investment decisions in 
technologically more sophisticated sectors, 
especially in manufacturing industry (see 
Bresser-Pereira 2008). 
The implications of exchange-rate volatil-
ity are hotly debated internationally and 
there is growing support for the view that 
the level of the exchange rate does indeed 
matter for growth and development (see 
Hausmann et al. 2006). Table 1 presents 
measures of exchange-rate volatility for 
20 economies. It shows that the real ex-
change rate in Brazil has been particularly 
volatile. 
However, it is more diffi cult to determine 
whether a country’s exchange rate is 
undervalued or overvalued. Even from the 
theoretical standpoint, there is no obvious 
way to defi ne the ‘right’ level of the real 
exchange rate. Nassif (2008) chooses 2000 
as the base year for judging the compara-
tive level of Brazil’s exchange rate. Few 
economists would doubt that before that 
year the exchange rate had been overval-
ued and thereafter a pronounced devalu-
ation helped to improve Brazil’s trade 
account. Using such a base year indicates 
that Brazil’s real exchange rate has been 
overvalued most of the time since 1989. 
The thesis that real exchange rate over-
valuation has prompted—along with other 
factors such as trade liberalisation—a 
process of de-industrialisation in Brazil 
has been the subject of a fi erce debate. 
Many heterodox economists in the country 
believe that Brazil suffers from some of 
the symptoms that are commonly ascribed 
to the so-called Dutch Disease. 
However, if such were the case, there 
should be a strong correlation between 
fl uctuations in the terms of trade and the 
behavior of the real (and the nominal) 
exchange rate. 
A careful look at historical trends indi-
cates, however, that although Brazil’s 
terms of trade have fl uctuated (and have 
risen dramatically both during the period 
1994-1997 and the recent period of com-
modity boom, 2001-2008), gyrations in 
the real and nominal exchange rates have 
been much larger, and have been unrelated 
to fl uctuations in the terms of trade. It is 
thus doubtful that the changes in Brazil’s 
terms of trade could explain its trade bal-
ance and, by implication, movements in its 
exchange rate. Causality appears to run, in 
fact, in the opposite direction. 
Portfolio Infl ows 
Since the 1980s, the stabilisation plans 
adopted in Latin America have involved 
liberalisation of the capital account and 
have relied on renewed infl ows of private 
capital. However, most of the infl ows have 
been portfolio investment, ‘hot money’, 
which previously had been restricted. 
When Brazil lifted capital controls and 
instituted high real rates of interest, the 
ensuing portfolio infl ows led to a strong 
revaluation of its currency. Even though 
Brazil began to run record trade defi cits, 
the fl ood of portfolio infl ows was initially 
celebrated by Brazilian offi cials. 
A general trend toward overvaluation of 
Brazil’s exchange rate has been inter-
spersed with isolated periods of signifi cant 
devaluation. The fi rst episode, in 1999, 
coincided with the crisis of the Plano Real 
and the adoption of a new policy regime 
that featured the usual neoliberal duo of 
infl ation targeting and fl exible exchange 
rates. The second peak refl ected the capital 
outfl ow from Brazil that resulted from 
the ‘fl ight to quality’ after 9/11 and the 
US recession in 2001. Another ‘fl ight to 
quality’ was triggered by the (unjustifi ed) 
fear of a signifi cant change in policy upon 
Lula’s election. Since then, however, there 
has been a sustained period of revaluation 
due, in part, to tight monetary policies and 
liberalisation of the capital account.
The Brazilian Central Bank has deserv-
edly earned a reputation of being one of 
the toughest practitioners of an infl ation-
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Maximum Minimum Amplitude Standard-
deviation
Russia 193.1 75.8 117.3 30.5
Argentina 107.6 37.3 70.2 25.0
Slovakia 178.0 84.4 93.6 26.5
Indonesia 166.0 52.1 113.9 24.5
Brazil 146.7 59.4 87.3 24.3
Philippines 132.2 82.0 50.2 12.4
Japan 119.4 63.2 56.2 12.0
Hong Kong SAR 117.0 70.3 46.7 11.9
Mexico 114.2 53.6 60.6 11.9
Korea 121.8 66.3 55.5 11.5
Thailand 138.6 77.6 61.0 11.3
Euro area 129.8 95.0 34.8 8.8
Taiwan (China) 108.3 77.1 31.2 8.4
Chile 112.1 79.3 32.8 7.8
China 112.1 71.4 40.8 7.4
United States 108.0 80.6 27.4 7.4
United Kingdom 102.9 79.8 23.2 6.5
Singapore 111.3 91.1 20.2 5.6
India 111.9 88.0 23.9 4.4
Denmark 111.9 98.1 13.8 3.3
Table 1. Effective Exchange Rate Indexes, Real (CPI-based), 
                      2000 = 100, 1994.7 – 2008.10 
Source: BIS.
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targeting monetary regime. Recognition 
that Brazil’s state is dominated by rentier 
interests also helps explain why monetary 
policy has remained totally fi xated on the 
infl ation rate. There is strong evidence 
that this monetary regime works mainly 
through the forceful impact of high real 
interest rates on maintaining an appreci-
ated exchange rate.
The Figure below provides an illustra-
tion of the policy of high interest rates 
in Brazil. It depicts a rough proxy of the 
covered interest rate differential of fi nan-
cial investment in Brazil. The solid black 
line in the fi gure is the result of subtracting 
from the Brazilian annualised policy inter-
est rate (the Selic) the sum of the Federal 
Funds interest rate, the Brazilian country-
risk measure (the Embi+) and the current 
change in the nominal exchange rate (see 
Prates and Farhi 2008). 
Since about 2003 this differential, though 
fl uctuating, has often exceeded ten per-
centage points, and sometimes even 15. 
This has been extraordinarily good news 
for fi nancial investors. But when one con-
siders that the Brazilian economy grew at 
only a mediocre 3.5 per cent from 2002 to 
2006, the results of such a tight monetary 
policy are much less impressive. 
In spite of revaluation in recent years, 
Brazil has maintained surpluses on its 
trade balance and after 2003 even on its 
current account. This resulted from gains 
in the terms of trade and, most impor-
tantly, growth in the volume of its exports. 
Moreover, for about two years (from mid 
2004 to mid 2006), Brazil even experi-
enced the somewhat unusual combination 
of revaluations of the real exchange rate 
and increases in the trade surplus. 
A New Polemic
Though heterodox economists forcefully 
warned that this situation could not last – 
and it didn’t – it introduced new elements 
into the old polemic about the evolution of 
the Brazilian structure of production and 
the country’s position in the international 
division of labour. More optimistic econo-
mists (who tend to be more conservative) 
quickly concluded that Brazil was fi nally 
reaping the fruits of the very long proc-
ess of structural reforms, which were 
supposed to purge the economy of the 
‘excesses’ of the period of import substitu-
tion. 
But during this long period of reforms, 
manufacturing industry declined. While 
it had represented 32 per cent of GDP in 
1986, it fell to a trough of 20 per cent in 
1998 and thereafter climbed back to only 
about 23 per cent in 2005. But in the last 
ten years, there has been a more notewor-
thy process of ‘selective’ de-industrialisa-
tion, in which the sectors more intensive in 
technology have been losing their capacity 
to add value, as national production chains 
have been replaced by global outsourcing 
(see Comin 2008 and Carneiro 2008). 
International comparisons make it pain-
fully clear that Brazil has followed—as 
have other Latin American countries—a 
much less promising development path 
than those pursued by successful Asian 
countries (Macedo e Silva 2008). Com-
pared to the performance of Latin Amer-
ica, industrial sectors based on high and 
medium technology have gown at a much 
quicker pace in Asia. 
Despite the recent surge in commodities 
prices, there are good reasons to believe 
that the structure of international trade will 
remain heavily biased towards medium 
and high-tech goods.
Table 2 (next page)  illustrates how Brazil 
lags behind in the sectors producing such 
goods. It shows the technological structure 
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of the imports by the 20 countries that 
contributed most to the growth of global 
imports in 2000-2005. The top fi ve coun-
tries were China, Germany, the US, Japan 
and the Netherlands. The ‘World’ columns 
show the composition of the total imports 
by the 20 countries while the ‘Brazil’ 
columns show the composition of their 
imports only from Brazil. 
This comparison highlights that Brazilian 
exports remain heavily concentrated in pri-
mary commodities, are over-represented in 
labour-intensive, resourced-based exports 
and low-skill, low-technology exports, but 
are under-represented in the exports with 
either medium or high levels of both skill 
and technology. Such structural factors 
do not bode well for Brazil’s long-term 
growth prospects. 
Summary
In sum, Brazil remains hampered by a 
long period of high real rates of interest 
and an overvalued exchange rate, a fragile 
industrial base and underdevelopment in 
the most dynamic sectors of international 
trade. 
These problems suggest that Brazil should 
initiate an economic transformation by 
adopting policies that are similar to those 
recommended to countries affected by 
Dutch Disease symptoms (especially since 
the recent discovery of huge reserves of 
pre-salt oil could transform the country 
into a major energy exporter). 
A promising start for such policies would 
involve taking bolder steps towards the 
management of its exchange rate and to-
wards promoting the diversifi cation of its 
structure of production and exports.
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World Brazil World Brasil World Brazil World Brazil
1990 1990 1995 1995 2000 2000 2005 2005
Primary commodities 16.5 48.5 15.2 54.0 11.4 46.7 11.4 47.9
Energy goods 11.9 2.7 7.8 0.7 10.7 2.5 14.3 5.5
Labor intensive and resource-
based
14.3 13.4 13.1 13.7 11.8 11.9 10.3 10.4
Low skill and technology intensity 5.8 12.5 7.5 10.6 7.2 8.2 7.5 9.2
Medium skill and technology 
intensity
24.2 12.8 27.2 12.1 27.5 14.1 25.6 15.2
High skill and technology intensity 22.3 8.8 23.9 7.0 25.6 12.8 25.7 9.4
Unclassifi ed 5.0 1.3 5.3 2.0 5.8 3.8 5.2 2.4
Table 2. The Technological Strucuture of Global Imports (for the most dynamic importers)
Source: COMTRADE.
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